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ABSTRACT 
A number of commercial vendors have tried to develop peripheral input device switches 
to provide high robustness, but most fail to achieve the assurance level necessary for use 
in a multi-level secure system.  This paper provides the groundwork for designing a 
highly robust peripheral input device switch for Universal Serial Bus (USB) keyboards 
and mice by defining the requirements, the external and internal interfaces, the data 
flows, and the state diagrams of the switch.  All of these are used to show that only a 
single computer connected to the switch is allowed to communicate with the attached 
keyboard and mouse at any given point in time, that a “Flush” command must precede 
any connection between an attached computer and the keyboard and mouse, and that no 
two CPPs are allowed to communicate with each other through the switch. 
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Since the inception of classified information, individuals and organizations 
needed to be able to access information at multiple classification levels (domains).  This 
has been accomplished over the years by using separate information systems for each 
domain, with each system having its own set of peripheral devices.  By separating the 
domains physically, one was assured that data of a higher classification would not be 
spilled to domain of a lower classification.  If a user requires access to several different 
security domains, a large workspace is needed to accommodate the keyboard, video 
display, and mouse associated with each information system.   
In an effort to minimize the amount of equipment needed to access multiple 
domains from a single workspace, initiatives like the One Box - One Wire (OB1) 
program are currently under development [1]. The OB1 program allows multiple domains 
to be built into one box.  This works toward the solution of minimized equipment, but it 
does not solve the problem of peripheral devices such as mice, keyboards, and monitors 
that are used as input/output devices.  The current system setup still involves a mouse, 
keyboard, and monitor for each domain installed in an OB1 system.  Figure 1 depicts an 
over exaggerated view of what a desktop with multiple systems connected to different 
domains would look like. 
  
Figure 1. Desktop Before Implementing a KVM switch1 
 
                                                 




Figure 2. Basic KVM Illustration2 
The use of a Keyboard, Video, and Mouse (KVM) Switch provides a solution to 
overcrowded desk space.  A KVM, or Peripheral Sharing Switch (PSS) [2], allows a 
single set of human interface devices to be shared among two or more computers.  A set 
of human interface devices could consist of a Universal Serial Bus (USB) keyboard, a 
USB mouse, and a Digital Video Interface (DVI) or Video Graphics Array (VGA) 
monitor.  However, a KVM can also provide ports to attach input and output audio 
devices, other USB devices such as but not limited to printers, common access card 
(CAC) readers, and flash memory, and serial keyboards and mice. 
Traditional KVMs are available commercially and are commonly used today in 
configurations that share peripheral input devices across multiple systems of the same 
classification level.  However, there are very few solutions that are able to or attempt to 
attain a certification level that is acceptable in a system with multiple computers with 
differing classification levels due to the high cost and robust design processes that must 
be followed to obtain an acceptable certification level.    
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this paper is to lay the groundwork for building a secure KVM 
capable of working in a multi-level secure environment.  This will be accomplished by 
the following:    
• Compare several products that are commercially available and identify 
possible weaknesses in these products. 
                                                 
2 Image available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KVM_switch 
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• Derive requirements of a secure KVM to ensure no loss of confidentiality or 
integrity. 
• Create a design proposal to include potential improvements of current 
technology. 
C. SCOPE 
A basic KVM allows a single monitor, mouse, and keyboard to be used to switch 
between multiple computers at the push of a button.  However, the research contained 
within this paper will concentrate only on switching the keyboard and mouse connection 
between the attached computers.   
Video switching capability is outside the scope of the work described here.  The 
video portion needed to complete the KVM will be assumed to be a black box that will 
securely switch between multiple security domains without loss of confidentiality or 
integrity.  The capability to share audio input/output devices will also be outside the 
scope of this research paper. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The Twin Peaks Model “intertwines requirements and architectures to achieve 
incremental development and speedy delivery” [3].  This method of development 
provides improvements over the Waterfall Model [4] and the Spiral Life-Cycle Model [5] 
by allowing the system to evolve without anchoring the design to rigid requirement 
documents that may not consider the architecture of the system and decreasing the 
amount of time to move from the requirements phase to the production phase.  Using the 
Twin Peaks approach, the requirements were refined based on architectural decisions.  
Some of the architectural decisions were based on security concerns, but others evolved 
based on the user’s experience with other KVMs.   
To understand the core requirements of the switch, background information is 
required such as what defines a KVM switch, a detailed review of the USB specification, 
and comparisons to commercially available KVMs.  The core requirements lead to 
derived requirements and design choices as the internal and external interfaces and 
different components of the switch are defined.  As each component is defined, a state 
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diagram is included to show the reader the functions that the component is to perform.  
The state diagrams evolve as the functionality of each component evolves through the 
derived requirements and design choices.  Data flow diagrams are included in the 
Appendix B to show what information is passed between the different components.   
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. WHAT IS A KVM SWITCH? 
A KVM switch is a device that allows a single keyboard, monitor, and mouse to 
be shared among multiple computers.  The user traditionally selects which computer will 
receive input and/or output from the peripheral devices on the switch via a push button or 
rotary knob; however, some switches do allow switching via keyboard shortcuts.  A 
keyboard shortcut is a specific sequence of keystrokes that triggers the switch’s internal 
mechanisms to perform a designated function. In this case, the function is switching from 
one computer to the next computer. 
B. KVM SWITCH TYPES 
1. Passive Switch 
The first KVM switches were passive mechanical devices.  By turning a knob on 
the front of the device, the user completes the electrical circuit needed for the peripheral 
devices to interact with the attached computer.  The completion of the circuit looks to the 
computer as if the peripheral devices are being plugged in to the computer directly.  
Likewise, when the computer is deselected, the computer thinks the peripheral devices 
were unplugged directly from the computer.  The major problem with the passive type of 
KVM is that many computers will not boot properly if a keyboard is not detected during 
the boot sequence, and thus, unless the computer is selected via the KVM prior to 
initiating the computer’s boot sequence, the computer will enter into an error state and 
halt the boot sequence.   
Another issue inherit with passive switches is that they rely on contact points to 
complete the electrical path.  The contact points wear down over time and eventually lose 
the ability to properly connect.  Passive KVM switches can still be purchased from 
electronics stores as they provide basic functionality to meet many users’ needs and are 
relatively inexpensive. 
The basic security principles of a passive switch consist of security by separation.  
The physical connections for each computer are designed in such a way as to ensure only 
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a single computer can connect to the attached peripheral devices.  However, as previously 
stated, only that computer will be able to detect a mouse and keyboard during the boot 
cycle. 
2. Active Switch 
An active switch differs from a passive switch in that it uses electricity to power 
the electronic circuits within the switch.  The electronic circuits allow active switches to 
combat the main problems that plague passive switches.  An active switch can emulate 
the peripheral devices to allow a computer that is not currently selected to boot properly 
by registering as both a generic mouse and keyboard or, in some cases as the actual 
make/model of the attached mouse and keyboard.  Also, by using electronic circuits, the 
contact points can that wear down over time causing the passive switch to fail are no 
longer an issue.   
Most modern day KVM switches are active and support USB interfaces because 
the user wants a friendlier switch that will not completely disconnect the mouse and 
keyboard from the non-selected computers.  As mentioned above, the user also does not 
have to worry about which computer is currently selected when booting the systems. 
Below we describe several existing USB KVMs.   
a. Avocent SC4-UAD KVM Switch 
The Avocent SC4-UAD KVM Switch was evaluated in 2007 to be 
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) certified at Evaluation Assurance 
Level 43 (EAL4), meaning that the switch was methodically designed, tested, and 
reviewed [6].  The reviewer noted that the manufacturing process could lead to 
compromised switches because of the Flash ROM used in the switch, and because “the 
isolation tests performed by NSA 172 show that the SC4-UAD does not meet certain 
specifications for signal separation” [7]. The switch contains some of the properties, as 
                                                 
3 The National Information Assurance Partnership’s Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation [6] states that “EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security 
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require 
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.”  
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well as lessons learned, that this paper will address as describing requirements for a 
secure keyboard and mouse switch.   
b. BAE Systems Interactive Link 
The BAE Systems Interactive Link device combines a KVM switch with a 
one way diode to allow control of both a low-side computer over a low-side network and 
a secure window server.  The Interactive Link device was evaluated at EAL54; meaning 
that the device was semi-formally designed and tested.  However, the device deviates 
from the traditional design of a KVM by requiring the use of software on the “high-side” 
computer that will allow keyboard, mouse and video traffic to be visually displayed from 
a “low-side” computer on the high-side computer.  Essentially, this device creates a 
secure “remote desktop” experience for a user on a classified network to access server or 
servers on a network of a lower classification [8]. 
c. Belkin OmniView Secure KVM 
Similar to the Avocent SC4-UAD KVM Switch, the Belkin OmniView 
Secure KVM was evaluated in 2009 to be NIAP-certified at EAL4, and the switch 
contains many of the properties, as well as lessons learned, that this paper will address as 
requirements for our KVM switch [9], [10]. 
C. USB SPECIFICATION  
As the USB specification is the standard for peripheral devices, specifically for 
keyboards and mice, the switch defined within this paper will utilize USB ports to 
connect both the peripheral devices and the computers to the switch.  Thus, an 
understanding of the USB specification is necessary to ensure proper controls are put in 
place to assure high robustness in the design.  
The USB specification was initially designed by seven companies looking to 
make it easier for external devices to connect to computers.  Before the introduction of 
                                                 
4 The National Information Assurance Partnership’s Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation [6] states that “EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security 
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of 
specialist security engineering techniques.”  
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USB, external devices were designed with proprietary ports and proprietary protocols. 
Only the computers designed for the use of those devices could use these devices. The 
industry saw the need to create a standard that would allow an external device to connect 
to any computer without the need for expensive add-on cards or complicated software. 
The USB bus is host centric, meaning that the host is the “initiator” of all protocol 
activities.  The host sends requests to the USB hub.  The hub acknowledges that it 
received a request but does not respond with the answer to the request from the end point 
until the host again asks the hub for information.  When an endpoint sends data, the last 
data packet contains all zeroes to tell the host that it is the last packet in that segment.   
A hub can provide the ability to increase the number of USB ports available to a 
host, and multiple hubs can be linked together to form a chain between the host and 
endpoint.  Each hub typically has a single upstream port and multiple downstream ports.  
A hub’s upstream port connects to either a downstream port of the host’s USB host 
controller or a downstream port of another hub’s USB function controller.  As detailed by 
the USB specification, only 126 peripheral devices, including hubs, can be attached to a 
single USB host controller [11]. 
1. USB Transaction Types 
USB transactions are similar to network packets flowing between devices.  Each 
transaction contains packets used to either setup the connection between devices and host 





The Message Sequence Chart (MSC) diagrams included in this section are taken 
from the “Universal Serial Bus Specification Revision 2.0” [11] where more detailed 
information can be obtained.  An MSC is used “to describe the interaction between a 
number of independent message-passing instances [12].”  
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a. IN Transaction Type 
The IN transaction type allows data that originates from the endpoint to be 
delivered to the host.  The host must first send a request to the endpoint requesting data 
from the endpoint starting with a start split (SSPLIT) packet and an IN packet.  The hub 
then sends an acknowledgement (ACK) to the host upon receiving the request but prior to 
forwarding the request on to the endpoint.  The endpoint responds to the host’s request 
with data packets or a Negative Acknowledgement (NAK) packet if there is no data 
available to send to the host. 
 
Figure 3. USB IN MSC. From [11] 
As with any sequence based protocol, data transfer errors can and do 
occur.  If the error occurs between the host and the hub, the host will automatically 
resend the request up to a maximum of three attempts if it doesn’t receive a response after 
a set amount of time. The hub will pass along the request to the endpoint once received.  
If, however, an error occurs after the endpoint has acknowledged the host’s request and 
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the host is now asking to complete the split (CSPLIT) packet, the hub will respond with a 
no response yet (NYET) packet telling the host that the request was accepted but it has 
not yet received any information from the endpoint.  The host will then know to resend 
the CSPLIT command at a later time. 
b. OUT Transaction Type 
The OUT transaction type permits data to be transmitted from the host to a 
device.  The host sends the data to the device, and the device responds with an ACK 
packet if successful or a NAK packet if an error occurred during the transaction. 
 




c. Setup Transaction Type 
The Setup transaction type is similar to the OUT transaction type, except 
that a device must accept and respond to a Setup transaction packet.   
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III. EXTERNAL INTERFACES 
A typical KVM switch defines the external interfaces to be ports for connecting 
input devices such as keyboards and mice, port or ports for connecting each computer, 
switching devices such as buttons, indicators to show which computers are connected, 
indicators to show which computer is currently selected, and a port to connect to a power 
supply.  Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict a generic 2-port KVM.  The keyboard and mouse 
ports on the front of the switch are part of the Input Peripheral Port Group (IPPG).  On 
the back of the switch, the port used to connect to the computer is designated as the 
Computer Peripheral Port (CPP).  A 2-port KVM has two distinct CPPs with a selection 
device used to switch between the two CPPs.    
 
 
Figure 6. 2-port KVM:  Front 
 
Figure 7. 2-port KVM:  Back 
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IV. USE CASE SCENARIOS 
The following use case scenarios will help to define the requirements of the 
system.  Some of the cases will describe the flow of a user interacting with the system 
with a MSC depicting the flow of information, but other cases will simply provide a 
description of the functionality provided by the switch.   
A use case scenario describes the interaction between a user and a system.  Each 
scenario describes inputs into the system, either external or internal, and their expected 
outcomes.   An external input can be described as any action performed that originates 
from the outside of the physical system.  Likewise, an internal input describes any action 
performed by the system that originates from within the physical system.  An internal 
input is usually the result of or an output from an external input. 
A. INITIAL SETUP 
In this section, we describe how the user interacts with our proposed KVM during 
the initial setup phase by using the written guidance provided with a specific switch.  The 
installer connects the user’s keyboard and mouse cables to the IPPG on the switch.  The 
installer connects each of the user’s computers (1 to n) to the corresponding CPP, labeled 
1 to n, on the switch.  The installer will use two cables, one for the mouse and one for the 
keyboard.  The installer labels the buttons (1 to n) on the front panel of the switch with 
the identity of the corresponding computer (e.g., Computer 1/Computer 2). Note:  This 
cabling may be connected in any order, but it will be assumed that the user will correctly 
connect the cables.  Lastly, the installer connects the switch’s power cable to the power 
outlet.   
B. POWER-ON CYCLE 
The system can be described as having two distinct power-on cycles.  Either the 
switch is powered on prior to one or more of the computers connected to it, or one or 
more of the computers are powered on before the switch.  Below we describe each of 
these.  
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1. Power-On Switch before Computers 
Following the Initial Setup phase, the user turns the switch on by plugging in the 
switch’s power cable. We assume that there is no separate “on-off” switch. During the 
switch’s boot cycle, the switch will initialize and set up the pathway between the IPPG 
and the attached keyboard and mouse.  At some point in time following the initialization 
of the switch’s power on cycle, the user will power on any number of the computers (1 to 
n).  During each computer’s boot cycle, the computer will communicate with the switch 
to initialize and set up the pathway between the computer and the CPP over the attached 
cables.  The computer(s) will see the switch ports as a generic hub with a generic mouse 
and keyboard attached to it.  The switch will provide a visual indication to the user once 
the switch detects the computer(s) are connected and powered on.  The sequence of 
operations is described in the message sequence chart show in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Message Sequence Chart:  Switch Powered On before Computer(s) 
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2. Power-On Computers before Switch 
In this scenario, the user does an “Initial Setup” before plugging in the KVM. 
Following the “Initial Setup” phase, the user then powers on any number of the 
computers (1 to n).  Since the KVM is unpowered, no physical keyboard or mouse is 
visible to the computer. So that the computer(s) can boot properly, the switch’s CPP 
emulates a physical keyboard and mouse.  The computer “thinks” it is creating a pathway 
between itself and a physical keyboard and mouse through the switch’s CPP.  At some 
point the user then powers on the switch by plugging in the switch’s power cable.  During 
the switch’s boot cycle, the switch tears down the temporary pathway between the 
computer(s) and the emulated keyboard and mouse.  The switch then allows a new 
pathway between the computer(s) and CPP(s) to be setup.  Also during the switch’s boot 
cycle, the switch will initialize and set up the pathway with the attached keyboard and 
mouse.  Upon completion of the computer’s boot cycle, the switch will visually show 
which computers are attached and powered on.  By default, no computer will be selected 
as the default pathway and thus the switch will wait for the user to select a computer for 
use before setting up the pathway between the attached keyboard and mouse and any of 
the computers.  This process is shown in the message sequence chart, Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Message Sequence Chart:  Computer(s) Powered On before Switch 
 18 
C. STANDARD OPERATION 
During “Standard Operation” we assume that one or more computers, a keyboard, 
and (optionally) a mouse are connected properly to the KVM and that the switch and 
computers have been powered on using one of two methods described above.  The user 
presses one of the buttons (1 to n) on the switch that correlates to an attached computer.  
The goal is to establish a connection between the attached computer and the keyboard 
and mouse.  The switch will visually show which button is currently selected while the 
data pathway is setup.  The switch will initialize and setup the data pathways between the 
attached keyboard and mouse and the selected computer.  As soon as the pathway is 
correctly set up, the switch will visually show to the user that the user is now able to send 
input to the attached computer via the keyboard and mouse.  At some point, the user will 
press a different button on the switch.  The switch will visually show which button is 
currently selected.  The switch will tear down the pathway from the Keyboard/Mouse and 
the previously selected computer, ensuring no residual data can flow to the newly 
selected computer. The switch then proceeds to setup the pathway between the 
Keyboard/Mouse and the newly selected computer.  The switch will visually show to the 
user that the user is now able to send input to the attached computer via the keyboard and 




Figure 10. Message Sequence Chart:  Standard Operation 
 
D. THE CURRENTLY SELECTED COMPUTER IS SELECTED AGAIN BY 
THE USER 
At some point during the standard operation scenario, the user may reselect the 
currently selected computer.  The switch shall disregard the user’s request as no action is 
required. 
E. KEYBOARD AND/OR MOUSE IS PLUGGED-IN OR UNPLUGGED 
AFTER THE SWITCH IS POWERED ON 
If the attached keyboard and/or mouse disconnects from the switch, the switch 
will tear down the connection between the keyboard and mouse.  If a computer is selected 
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while the keyboard and/or mouse are disconnected, then the switch will setup the generic 
keyboard and mouse emulation.  The user is then free to reconnect the same or different 
keyboard/mouse to the switch.  Once connected, the switch will initialize and setup the 
connection with the keyboard and/or mouse.  If a computer is currently selected, the 
switch will setup the pathway between the Keyboard/Mouse and the currently selected 
computer. 
F. CURRENTLY SELECTED COMPUTER IS DISCONNECTED FROM 
THE KVM 
If an attached computer, which is the currently selected computer, is powered off 
or otherwise disconnects from the switch, the switch will tear down the pathway from the 
Keyboard/Mouse and the currently selected computer.  The switch will no longer visually 
show the currently selected computer as a viable option and will reset the ports in 
anticipation of a different computer connecting to them.  The user will need to select 
another computer for use. 
G. ADDITIONAL COMPUTER(S) ARE CONNECTED TO THE SWITCH 
AFTER A PREVIOUSLY ATTACHED COMPUTER IS SELECTED 
A computer is powered on and attached to the switch after the switch is powered 
on and after a separate computer is powered on, attached to the switch, and selected via 
the switch’s front panel button.  The newly attached computer will detect the switch as a 
powered hub with a generic keyboard and mouse attached to the hub.  Once the switch 
detects the computer is connected and powered on, the switch will visually show that the 
computer is attached and powered on. 
H. COMPUTER NOT CURRENTLY SELECTED IS DISCONNNECTED 
FROM THE SWITCH 
If an attached computer that is not currently selected is powered off or the 
computer’s cables are disconnected, the switch will tear down the connection between the 
computer’s cables and the switch ports and reset those ports in anticipation of a possibly 
different computer connecting to them.   The switch will also no longer visually represent 
the disconnected computer as a viable choice. 
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I. THE SWITCH LOSES POWER 
If the switch loses power without the user unplugging the power cable, the switch 
will not gracefully shutdown.  All pathways between the attached computers and the 
switch as well as the switch and the attached keyboard and mouse will be terminated.  
Any computer attached to the switch that is currently powered on will be responsible for 
providing power to its respective CPP.  The switch’s CPP will use the supplied power 
over the attached cables to emulate an attached Keyboard/Mouse.  The switch will not 
visually represent which computers are attached and powered on.   
J. FAIL SECURE 
In the unlikely event that some part of the switch malfunctions or otherwise 
becomes inoperable, the switch shall fail secure.  The secure failure state shall be defined 
as “no data shall be allowed to flow through the switch.”  To mitigate the potential of a 
component failing, the switch shall be designed and built using reliable hardware. 
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V. MISUSE CASE SCENARIOS 
Use case scenarios are helpful to describe how the user is intended to utilize the 
switch in day-to-day operations, however, certain situations should be considered to 
ensure the integrity of the switch is maintained.  These misuse case scenarios, describe 
when the user, either intentionally or unintentionally, attempts to use the switch in a 
manner that is prohibited by security posture of the switch.  The switch should be able to 
detect these events and prevent them from occurring. 
A. UNAUTHORIZED DEVICE IS PLUGGED INTO THE KEYBOARD 
AND/OR MOUSE PORT 
A user may try to plug in a non-approved device into the keyboard and/or mouse 
port during standard operation.  The switch will detect the unapproved device and disable 
the port.  The switch will re-enable the disabled port upon detection of a new, approved 
device connecting to the port. 
B. THE CURRENTLY SELECTED COMPUTER SENDS DATA PACKETS 
INTENDED FOR A NON-HUMAN INTERFACE DEVICE (HID) 
The currently selected computer, either through error or malicious activity, may 
try to send data packets that a HID device should not receive, such as data intended for a 
storage device.  The switch shall drop these packets before they are allowed to reach the 
attached keyboard and/or mouse. 
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VI. REQUIREMENTS AND ARCHITECTURAL 
REFINEMENTS 
Requirements are essential to creating an accurate and complete design.  A design 
without requirements has no purpose and can never be considered complete.  
Requirements provide test accuracy by which a system or design can be verified for 
correctness.  There are many types of requirements that can be assigned to a system from 
basic functionality to specific architecture requirements.   
The basic or functional requirements define the core functionality of the system.  
Engineers and architects take the core requirements and start to implement them within a 
physical design.  During the design process, additional requirements or derived 
requirements may surface based on architectural decisions or constraints.5   
In this section, each requirement is defined and then discussed.  State diagrams 
are included and are expounded upon as requirements mature or additional requirements 
are added to the components of the switch.  From the core requirements derived 
requirements and design choices will be introduced with diagrams of the switch 
components, the components’ state diagrams, and tables describing the variables used in 
the state diagrams to help guide the reader. 
A. CORE REQUIREMENTS 
The main purpose of the switch is to provide the ability for a number of 
computers to be connected to a single keyboard and single mouse.  However, only one of 
the attached computers should be allowed to communicate with the keyboard and mouse 
at any given point in time. 
C-1. The switch shall enable communication between a keyboard and a 
mouse and at most one computer connected to the switch at a given 
point in time. 
                                                 
5 Core requirements, derived requirements, and design choices are denoted by “C-xx”, “D-xx”, and 
“DC-xx,” respectively. 
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Now that the base functionality of the switch has been defined, the security 
posture should be established.  This will ensure that data flows are well defined and all 
external interfaces are secured. 
C-2. Prevent communication via the switch between attached computers. 
The switch is not intended to be a data transfer device and should not allow any 
data to pass between computers either directly or indirectly.  If a user should wish to 
move data between the attached computers, the user should find another means to do so, 
such as over a network, through a Cross Domain Solution, or via external media (i.e., 
CD/DVD or external hard disk drive).   
Devices, such as CAC Readers, may be required to access a particular system or 
service that is provided by one or more of the attached computers.  Other devices, such 
as hubs and splitters, allow the number of defined ports on the switch to be increased so 
that more peripheral devices can be attached to the switch.   However, devices such as 
these will not be allowed to communicate through the switch. 
C-3. The switch shall not allow communications with peripheral devices 
connected to the IPPG other than a keyboard on the keyboard port 
and a mouse on the mouse port. 
Along with the core functionality and security requirements, the switch will need 
to provide a way for a user to select which computer is permitted to communicate with 
the keyboard and mouse.  This should give the user confidence that the keyboard and 
mouse will be interacting with the correct computer. 
C-4. The switch shall allow the user to select the computer to be paired 
with the attached keyboard and mouse. 
Once the user has selected a computer with which to interact, the user may, at 
some point, need to be reminded which computer is actively paired with the mouse and 
keyboard.  This indicator will also be useful for a new user accessing the switch and 
computers to instantly know which of the computers, if any, are actively paired with the 
keyboard and mouse. 
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C-5. The switch shall, indicate which computer, if any, is paired with the 
attached keyboard and mouse. 
The switch needs to operate transparently and allow the connected external 
computer systems to operate normally.   At startup, most computer basic input/output 
systems (BIOS) run diagnostic checks to determine if a keyboard is attached and if the 
keyboard is functioning properly.  If the computer’s BIOS does not detect a keyboard 
attached to the system during startup, the system will normally halt any further 
operations. The switch will function in such a way as to prevent this error condition from 
occurring while the switch is in either state, powered on or powered off. 
C-6. The computers connected to the switch shall be able to boot normally. 
B. INITIAL DERIVED REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN CHOICES 
Derived requirements are “requirements that are implied or transformed from 
higher-level requirement” [13]. Design choices reflect the outcome of the analysis of 
alternative design implementations.  The development process typically alternates 
between refinement of requirements (core and derived) and refinement of the design 
(design choices). 
D-1. The switch shall be powered. 
As the switch provides an indicator that dissipates power, the first and second 
laws of thermodynamics dictate that the switch consumes power from either an internal 
or external source. 
DC-1. Standard wall power will be used to power the device. 
In addition to providing an indicator, the switch will likely incorporate other 
power consuming electronics.  For engineering convenience the switch will utilize 
standard wall power, such as can be found in a typical computing environment, to 
provide power while the device is powered on.  This is in lieu of alternative power 
sources such as battery or solar power that have limited life or availability.  The exact 
power standard will be determined by the electrical engineer who implements the design 
based on the circuitry used and the country’s or countries’ electrical standards to be 
supported. 
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DC-2. Conventional COTS IT and electronics shall be utilized. 
To both save time and money, the device will consist primarily of commercial off 
the shelf (COTS) information technology (IT) and electronics to the extent that the 
security posture of the switch can be verified.  Custom components may be needed to 
combine the standard technology into a functioning device, but their use will be 
minimized where possible. 
D-2. Core requirements C1, C-3, C-4, and C-5 are applicable only when 
the switch is powered on.  
As conventional active electronics will be used in the switch, communication 
through the switch is only possible when it is powered on.  Being able to select a 
computer and view the selection is only useful when communication is possible.  Note 
that core requirements C-2 and C-6 are applicable whether the switch is powered on or 
off.  
D-3. The switch shall not allow communication between the keyboard and 
mouse and any computer when the switch is powered off.  
Derived requirement D-2 only addresses what occurs when the power is on.  The 
implied behavior of no information flow when the switch is off is likely implemented in 
the default behavior of the switch.  
D-4.  As viewed externally, the switch shall have a finite set of atomic state 
transitions. 
An atomic state transition is defined as a transition that does not require any 
intermediary steps to change states. 
D-5. The switch shall visually present a finite set of internal states of the 
switch. 
The set of internal states that the switch can visually present to the user is the 
status of the attached computer(s), the status of the connected keyboard and mouse, and 
the status of the currently paired computer. 
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DC-3. The switch will support at least two computers. 
The use of two computers is the least costly case. 
DC-4. The switch will present the internal states identifying which computer 
is paired with the attached keyboard and mouse through the switch. 
With the switch powered on, the user shall be provided a means to quickly 
determine which CPP, if any, is currently selected.  By providing a quick reference for 
the user, the switch can better manage the user’s expectation of which computer is 
currently able to interact with the keyboard and mouse.  If the switch is not powered on, 
the user will be unable to use the attached keyboard and/or mouse to interact with any 
attached computer.  Therefore, when powered off, the switch does not need to provide a 
means for the user to determine which computer is currently selected. 
Figure 11 depicts the finite set of atomic states for a two computer KVM that the 
user will see before and after pressing a “user selection device.” The initial state assumes 
the switch is powered on, and one or more computers are attached and powered on.  
 
Figure 11. Basic Switch States as Seen from the User’s Perspective 
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Each state in Figure 11 is defined by the variables in Table 1: 
 
Variable Name Values Description 
Selected Computer 
Indicator (X or Y) 
0 The visual indicator defined by the Selected Computer 
Indicator (X or Y) is off. 
Selected Computer 
Indicator (X or Y) 
1 The visual indicator defined by the Selected Computer 
Indicator (X or Y) is on. 
Table 1. Basic Switch States’ Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
 
DC-5. The main components of the switch will consist of an IPPG, a finite 
number of CPPs, a switch module, and a user interface (see Figure 
12). 
• IPPG.  The IPPG provides connection ports on the switch that allow 
a single keyboard to be plugged into the keyboard port and a single 
mouse to be plugged into the mouse port. 
• CPP.  Each CPP provides a connection port on the switch that 
allows one computer to be plugged in at a time. 
• Core Switch Module (CSM).  The CSM controls the process of 
switching from one CPP to another, as well as, ensures the security 
posture of the device is maintained.  The CSM communicates with the 
IPPG, the CPPs, and the user interface. The module contains a 
processor and the memory needed to properly support the functions of 
the switch. 
• User Interface.  The user interface provides the means by which 
the user selects the desired computer and determines which computer, 
if any, is currently selected.  The user interface contains user selection 
devices and selected computer indicators. 
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Figure 12. Initial Design Diagram 
D-6. The switch shall only pair with an active computer connected to a 
CPP. 
Only active connected computers can provide viable communications.  A non-
connected computer or computer that is powered off will be unable to provide the 
required input(s) into the switch. 
DC-6. The switch will indicate which computers are available. 
The switch will provide an indicator for each computer displaying its availability 
(i.e., connected and active).  This indicates to the user which computer selection choices 
will be allowed. Thus the User Interface component of the switch design should include 
an “Available Computer Indicator” (see Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13. Initial Design with Available Computer Indicators 
Figure 14 depicts the finite set of states of the switch before and after connecting 
a computer to the switch. Each state contains both an internal state and an external state.  
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The internal state, Computer X Available, allows the switch to track which CPP has an 
active computer connected while the external state, Available Computer Indicator X, 
allows the switch to visually represent to the user which CPP is connected to an active 
computer.  The initial state assumes the switch is powered on and one or more of the 
computers is powered on.   
 
Figure 14. CPP–Basic State Machine 
Each state in Figure 14 is defined by the variables in Table 2: 
 
Variable Name Values Description 
Computer X Available 0 Computer X is either not connected to CPP X or it is 
connected to CPP X but not powered on. 
Computer X Available 1 Computer X is connected to CPP X and is powered on. 
Available Computer 
Indicator X  
0 Computer X is either not connected to CPP X or it is 
connected to CPP X but not powered on. 
Available Computer 
Indicator X  
1 Computer X is connected to CPP X and is powered on. 





D-7. At no point in time shall two CPPs be allowed to communicate 
through the core switching module. 
As the switch transitions from state to state based on both internal and external 
state changes, no data shall be allowed to pass between CPPs.  Figure 11 represents the 
basic states showing that at no time will the switch be able to enter a state in which both 
CPPs are actively connected to the peripheral Keyboard and Mouse.  This implies that 
two CPPs will neither be allowed to communicate with each other nor simultaneously 
communicate with the IPPG.  The requirement ensures that the fundamental security 
principle of the switch is properly supported. 
D-8. The switch shall protect the integrity of the communications between 
computer selection devices, the selected computer indicators, the 
CPPs, and the CSM itself. 
The computer pairing selected by the user, the computer pairing indicated to the 
user, and the actual computer pairing must be identical.  The integrity of the security 
enforcing behavior of the selection operation must be maintained.  
DC-7. Protective Design. 
The switch will use a protective enclosure with anti-tamper features to prevent 
unauthorized access to security components and their communication paths.  The internal 
design will implement the security principles of domain separation, process isolation, 
resource encapsulation, modularity, simplicity, least privilege, secure initialization, safe 
failure, and trusted recovery. 
C. DESIGN CHOICES – EXTERNAL INTERFACES 
The switch’s external interfaces are the points of the device where the user will 
either plug-in a device or provide input to the switch.  As previously defined, the CPPs 
and IPPG will consist of ports that will enable a keyboard and mouse attached to the 
IPPG to communicate with a computer attached to one of the CPPs.  The ports could be 
defined by any number of standard interfaces in use today such as IEEE 1394 or 
FireWire, PS/2, serial, or USB.  Any of these defined protocols would allow a mouse and 
keyboard to interact with a computer.  However, the IEEE 1394 protocol is overkill, with 
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up to 400Mbit/s, for the amount of data that would need to be transferred between the 
keyboard and mouse and computer.  Both PS/2 and serial interfaces have been replaced 
in most modern computing devices by the USB interface.  Thus the switch shall use USB 
as the defined interface and protocol. 
The USB standard defines a protocol that will allow the user the flexibility to 
choose from the large number of standard USB keyboards and mice available on the 
market today.  The use of the USB standard will also help to keep the cost of designing 
and building the switch lower.  If a non-standard protocol or interface is implemented in 
the switch, the designer would need to potentially provide a custom keyboard and mouse 
along with cables to connect the switch to the computers.  If the keyboard, mouse, or any 
of the cables were to fail, the user would be forced to contact the switch supplier.  The 
user would possibly experience unacceptable downtime if the supplier is unable to repair 
or replace the malfunctioning equipment in a timely manner. 
DC-8. The external ports to the switch will be defined by the USB standard. 
In order to properly support the USB ports, a separate USB function controller 
will be paired with each port group, one for the IPPG and one for each CPP.  The 
controller paired with each CPP will be responsible for correctly communicating with the 
upstream USB host controller in the attached computer.  Likewise, the controller 
connected to the IPPG will be responsible for correctly communicating with the currently 
selected upstream CPP. 
DC-9. Each CPP and the IPPG will be coupled with a USB Controller. 
The switch will also need to provide an interface by which the user can select 
which computer is allowed to communicate with the keyboard and mouse.  A collection 
of physical buttons provides the user the means to choose between the different 
computers attached to the switch.  The buttons will also provide tactile feedback so that 





DC-10. The switch will utilize physical buttons for computer selection. 
An interface is defined as the place at which independent and often unrelated 
systems meet and act on or communicate with each other.6  An interface can provide 
input(s), output(s), or both between the systems that connect at the interface.   The 
buttons on the front of the switch allow the user to provide input into the CSM.  In return, 
each button shall be paired with a green LED light that will illuminate when the switch 
detects a button press.  The light shall serve as a visual representation of the user’s 
current CPP selection.  
DC-11. The switch will utilize a GREEN LED light to visually represent the 
currently selected CPP. 
The user can use the light as a visual reminder of which CPP is currently selected; 
however, the user may not know which CPP is currently connected to an active computer.  
The switch shall provide a second visual indicator, an amber LED light, to represent an 
active CPP, which is defined by an attached computer that is powered on.  
DC-12. The switch will utilize an AMBER LED light to visually represent 
an active CPP. 
After pressing a button to select a CPP, the user can expect a slight delay while 
the switch either transitions between CPPs or initially configures the path between the 
IPPG and the selected CPP.  To ensure a positive user experience, the GREEN LED shall 
not fully illuminate until the path between the selected CPP and the IPPG is fully setup.   
DC-13. The GREEN LED will blink while the path between a CPP and the 
IPPG is being setup. 




                                                 
6 See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interface. 
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LED Color Functional Description 
Amber A computer is attached to the CPP and powered on. 
Green Data can flow from the IPPG to the CPP 
Green 
Flashing 
The CPP is selected, but the device will not allow data to flow from 
the IPPG to the CPP yet. 
Table 3. LED Colors and Functional Descriptions 
 
With the external interfaces clearly defined, an accurate drawing (see Figure 15) 
of the currently defined switch components is below. 
 
Figure 15. Switch Including Initial Design Choices 
D. DESIGN CHOICES – SECURITY SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS 
Security supporting functions are defined as functions that do not directly enforce 
the core security principles but assist in providing assurance that the switch remains in a 
secure state.  The switch will need to provide assurance that the correct CPP 
corresponding to the button pressed by the user is communicating with the peripheral 
devices attached to the IPPG.  To provide this assurance, the buttons will need to directly 
communicate with and only with the CSM.     
DC-14. The buttons on the front panel will only communicate with the CSM. 
As each green LED light is paired directly with a single button to visually 
represent the user’s selection, the green LED lights should be controlled by the CSM as 
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well.  The switch will utilize the green LED lights to provide the user assurance that the 
path between the IPPG peripheral device(s) and the selected CPP is trustworthy and 
functioning correctly. 
DC-15. The green LED lights will be controlled by the same secure processor 
as the buttons. 
The attached computers will need access to a keyboard to prevent boot errors.  
However, when the switch is powered off or powered on but the CPP is not currently 
selected, the computer will not be able to communicate with the keyboard attached to the 
IPPG. Thus, the switch shall couple each CPP with an emulation module (EM) that will 
be responsible for mimicking a generic keyboard.  This will allow any computer to boot 
or reboot at any time while attached to the switch without fear of hanging during the boot 
process due to a keyboard detection error. 
Emulation involves allowing a computer attached to a CPP to logically think that 
a physical keyboard is plugged in and available via the USB cable even though a physical 
keyboard is not connected.   
DC-16. Each CPP will be coupled with an EM designed to emulate USB 
keyboard functionality to ensure any attached computer can 
properly boot. 
As each EM will need to operate while the switch is powered off, each EM will 
need to draw power via the USB cable connected to the attached computer.  Once the 
switch is powered on, the emulator shall draw its power from the switch power supply.  
DC-17. Each EM will be powered via USB from the attached computer while 
the switch is powered off. 
E. DESIGN CHOICES – SECURITY ENFORCING FUNCTIONS 
Security enforcing functions are defined as functions that directly affect or 
determine the security posture of the device.  The components of the switch that have the 
responsibility of ensuring the switch remains in a secure state comprise the trusted 
computing base (TCB).  The TCB consists of the hardware, software, and firmware that 
is responsible for enforcing the security policy [13].  
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The USB protocol defines the subclass field to report if an HID supports a boot 
interface.  The IPPG can read this field during the initial setup phase that occurs when the 
switch is powered on and the IPPG detects a USB peripheral on the Keyboard and/or 
Mouse port.  Once the IPPG determines the value of the subclass field, the IPPG will 
either allow further communications, if the subclass equals 1, or disallow further 
communication to or from the non-bootable HID(s) connected to the front port(s) of the 
switch.  
DC-18. The IPPG will be coupled with a secure module to ensure that only 
USB packets originating from a HID are transmitted through the 
switch. 
The IPPG can further use the USB protocol’s bInterfaceProtocol field to 
determine if the bootable HID is a keyboard, a mouse, or some other HID.  The HID 
should set the field to “1” for a keyboard, “2” for a mouse, or “0” for other during the 
initial USB Setup process with the IPPG.  Thus, assuming the HID is trusted to set this 
field correctly, the IPPG will be able to block communications from a non-HID, a mouse 
attached to the keyboard port, and/or a keyboard attached to the mouse port as required 
by the core requirement C-3.  In addition, the IPPG will send a signal to the CSM 
indicating the status of “Keyboard Available.”  The basic states for the IPPG can be seen 
in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. IPPG–Basic State Machine 
Figure 17 then illustrates the error state that the switch will transition to when a 
non-HID device is detected on the Keyboard Port, the Mouse Port, or both.  The same 
error state will also be utilized for when a keyboard is connected to the mouse port and/or 
a mouse is connected to the keyboard port.  To ensure the user is aware that the IPPG has 
triggered the error state, the IPPG will utilize an error indicator light on the front of the 
switch.  The error indicator light will be a red LED located near the keyboard and mouse 
ports of the IPPG (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 17. IPPG State Machine Including  Error Handling State  
 41 







0 A keyboard is not connected to the keyboard port of the IPPG. 
Keyboard 
Available 
1 A keyboard is connected to the keyboard port of the IPPG. 
Mouse 
Available 
0 A mouse is not connected to the mouse port of the IPPG. 
Mouse 
Available 
1 A mouse is connected to the mouse port of the IPPG. 
IPPG Error 0 The IPPG is not in the ERROR state. [LIGHT OFF] 
IPPG Error 1 The IPPG has detected either a Non-HID connected to either the mouse 
port, keyboard port or both, a keyboard is connected to the mouse port, 
or a mouse is connected to the keyboard port. [LIGHT ON] 
Table 4. IPPG’s Basic Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
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Figure 18 displays the final design of the switch after all components have been 
defined with Table 5 describing the three different colored LEDs. 
 
 
Figure 18. Switch Design–Final Iteration 
Similar to the IPPG, the CPP is responsible for protecting the switch from USB 
packets sent from any of the attached computers that are not intended for a HID.   The 
CPP will monitor the USB traffic coming from the attached computer and only allow 
USB Setup packets (Figure 5) or USB IN packets (Figure 3).   
DC-19. The CPP will be coupled with a secure module to ensure only USB 
packets designated for an HID are transmitted through the switch. 
To continue to ensure a positive user experience, the switch will need to provide 
visual indication for when a CPP has entered into the error state due to detected problems 
with any incoming USB packets.  As each CPP is already in control of an Available 
Computer Indicator, the Available Computer Indicator will flash on and off while in the 
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error state.  The error state can only be cleared by either disconnecting the computer 
causing the error condition or resetting the switch through a power cycle. 
 
LED Color Functional Description 
Amber - On A computer is attached to the CPP and powered on. 
Amber - Off A computer is not attached to the CPP or not powered on. 
Amber - Flashing The CPP has detected a USB packet destined for a non-HID and has 
entered the error state, disallowing further data from the computer 
attached to the CPP from flowing to the CSM. 
Green - On The CPP is selected and the path between the selected CPP and the IPPG 
is logically connected. 
Green - Of The CPP is not selected and no logical path exists between the CPP and 
the IPPG. 
Green -  Flashing The CPP is selected, but the switch is still establishing the connection 
between the selected CPP and the IPPG. 
Red - On The IPPG is in the Error State. 
Table 5. LED Colors and Functional Descriptions–Final 
 
DC-20. The Computer Available Indicator will flash to denote an error 
condition detected by the CPP.  
Figure 19 adds both an error condition to each CPP as well as a signal to the CSM 
if a computer is or is not connected to the CPP.  When the error condition is detected, a 




Figure 19. CPP State Machine Including Error Handling State 
Table 6 defines the new values available to CPP X’s variables with the addition of 
the error state: 
 
Variable Name Value Description 
Available Computer 
Indicator X  
2 CPP X has detected an error caused by the connected 
Computer X. 
CPP X Error 0 CPP X is not in the ERROR state. 
CPP X Error 1 CPP X has detected an USB Packet originating from 
Computer X to be a non USB Setup or USB IN packet. 
Table 6. CPP with Error State Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
 
With the external interfaces properly secured, the switch will need to ensure the 
CSM only connects the currently selected computer with the attached keyboard and 
mouse.  The CSM will be responsible for: 
• Ensuring only the currently selected computer is allowed to communicate 
with the attached keyboard and mouse. 
• Providing a secure transition state to ensure data is not inadvertently sent 
to the previously selected CPP. 
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To ensure the CSM is able to correctly initiate, maintain, and transition 
connections between any of the connected computers, the CSM will need to be aware of 
each CPP’s state.  Specifically, the CSM will need to know the status of “Computer X 
Available” from each CPP.  If “Computer X Available” is set to 0, then the CSM shall 
ignore any user pressing Button X.  However, if “Computer X Available” is set to 1, then 
the CSM will begin the process of allowing the attached Keyboard and/or Mouse to 
connect to the computer requested by the user.   
DC-21. The CSM will consist of a secure module responsible for ensuring the 
correct CPP is allowed to communicate with the IPPG. 
DC-22. The CSM will ignore any user pressing Button X if “Computer X 
Available” is set to 0. 
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Figure 20 visually represents the current state machine of the CSM. 
 
Figure 20. CSM Basic State Machine 
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Table 7 provides the CSM variables, values, and descriptions not previously 
defined: 
 
Variable Name Value Description 
Selected 
Computer 
Indicator X  
0 The light is off.  Computer X is not selected. 
Selected 
Computer 
Indicator X  
1 The light is blinking.  Computer X is selected, but the data path 




Indicator X  
2 The light is on.  Computer X can fully communicate with the 
attached Keyboard and Mouse. 
Computer 
Selected 
0 The user has not pressed the “User Selection Device X.” 
Computer 
Selected 
X The user has pressed the “User Selection Device X.” 
Keyboard 
Available 
0 The IPPG has not yet reported a keyboard connected to the 
keyboard USB port or has reported the keyboard disconnected 
from keyboard USB port. 
Keyboard 
Available 
1 The IPPG has reported a keyboard connected to the keyboard 
USB port. 
Table 7. CSM’s Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
 
The CSM will need to provide a secure transition state or set of states, Figure 21, 
which allows the IPPG and the attached keyboard and/or mouse to properly switch from 
interacting with one CPP to interacting with a different without allowing data intended 
for the previously selected CPP to reach the newly selected CPP.   
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DC-23. The CSM will provide a secure transition state or set of states 
allowing the IPPG to disconnect from the previously selected CPP 
and connect to the newly selected CPP. 
The CSM will enter the transition state or states when the user presses one of the 
buttons on the front of the switch.  The CSM will immediately cause the “Selected 
Computer Indicator” to begin blinking, providing a visual indicator to the user that the 
switch is in the process of connecting the desired CPP to the IPPG.  If a different CPP 
was previously selected, the CSM will also immediately stop all communications 
between the previously selected CPP and the IPPG.  In addition, the CSM will send the 
IPPG a “Flush” command informing the IPPG that it needs to clear the buffers contained 
in the attached USB Keyboard and Mouse.  The CSM will then wait for the IPPG to 
respond that the command completed successfully or the timeout period has been 
exceeded.  If the command times out, the CSM will turn off the “Selected Computer 
Indicator X,” signaling that the user will need to reselect the CPP or select a different 
CPP.  If, however, the command succeeds, the CSM will allow the regular USB SETUP 
process to occur between the selected CPP and the keyboard/mouse, “q6” in Figure 21.  
Once the Setup process has completed, the CSM will continuously illuminate the 
“Selected Computer Indicator X” until the switch is powered off, the computer connected 
to CPP X is disconnected, or the user selects a different CPP with which to interact. 
DC-24. The CSM will send a “Flush” command to the IPPG as part of the 
secure transition state or set of states. 
DC-25. The CSM will wait for the IPPG to confirm completion of the 
“Flush” command before allowing the newly selected CPP to be 
connected to the IPPG or time out reverting back to the “none 
selected” state. 
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Figure 21 depicts the state machine of the CSM to include the transition states. 
 
Figure 21. CSM State Machine Including Transition States
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Flush  0 The “Flush” command has not been issued, has completed, or has 
timed out. 
Flush  1 The “Flush” command is currently running. 
Table 8. CSM’s Updated Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
 
As part of the transition states, the IPPG, Figure 22, is responsible for ensuring 
the buffers of the attached keyboard and mouse are cleared before a new connection can 
be established with a CPP and reporting back to the CSM once the process is complete.  
The IPPG will use the same “Flush” command whenever a keyboard or mouse is 
plugged-in and detected by the IPPG to ensure a clean start state for the device’s buffers 
before alerting the CSM that a keyboard is available.  The IPPG will use the same 
“Keyboard Available” signal to alert the CSM when the “Flush” command has 
completed. 
DC-26. The IPPG will ensure the buffers of the attached keyboard and 
mouse are properly flushed insuring residual data is removed. 
DC-27. The IPPG will report back to the CSM once the “Flush” command 
has completed successfully. 
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Figure 22 depicts the state machine of the IPPG with the Flush states. 
 
Figure 22. IPPG State Machine Including Flush Command States
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Table 9 provides the updated IPPG’s variables, values, and descriptions not 
previously defined: 
 
Variable Name Value Description 
Flush Keyboard 0 The “Flush” command has not been issued or has completed. 
Flush Keyboard 1 The “Flush” command is currently running. 
Flush Mouse 0 The “Flush” command has not been issued or has completed. 
Flush Mouse 1 The “Flush” command is currently running. 
Table 9. IPPG’s Updated Variables, Values, and Descriptions 
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The following diagrams (Figure 23 and Figure 24) represent the state diagram of the CSM of a 2-port keyboard/mouse 
switch.  A 2-port switch would allow at most 2 computers to share a single keyboard and mouse.  These diagrams were split 








Figure 24. (B) CSM State Machine–2 CPPs
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VII. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. ANALYSIS 
In this paper, our goal was to define the requirements of a highly robust peripheral 
sharing switch for HIDs and to show, at a high level, a secure design.  Each requirement 
was examined for security implications and derived requirements or design choices were 
made to adequately cover potential security flaws.   
The requirements and the data flow diagrams included in Appendix B were 
instrumental in defining the state diagrams for the main components (IPPG, CPP, and 
CSM) of the switch.  The three state diagrams Figure 19, Figure 22, and Figure 23/Figure 
24 combine to create the complete state diagram for the highly robust peripheral sharing 
switch.  Each component evolved as derived requirements and design choices combined 
to describe the data flows between the IPPG and the CSM, the CSM and each CPP, and 
the IPPG and each CPP.  Once internal and external data flows for each component were 
clearly defined, the state diagrams were developed to clearly show the state of each 
component at any given time. 
The state diagram for the CSM (Figure 23 and Figure 24), with the help of the 
state transition table (Table 10), clearly show that at no time can the switch enter into a 
state where more than one CPP is communicating with the IPPG at the same time and a 
flush command is always issued before a connection is allowed between a CPP and the 
IPPG.   
The first two requirements are shown to be true in the CSM state machine 
depicted in Figure 23 and Figure 24.  That is, no state is capable of allowing the 
“Computer Selected” to be both X and Y, and the states q12, q13, q22, and q23 are only 
accessible if the CSM first transitions through q6, q7, q16, or q17.  The third requirement 
will be shown to hold true with the combination of the CSM state machine and the 
implementation of the CSM.    
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Table 10 is the state transition table for the CSM when two computers (X and Y) are connected to the switch.  The first 
column contains the states and the first row contains the events associated with CSM.  The intersection of each row and 
column lists the next state, if the event is valid for the current state, and any associated actions that will occur upon 

























































q0 q0 q0 q1 q0 q2 q0 q2 q0 - - - - 
q1 q1 q1 - q0 q14 q1 q15 q1 - - - - 
q2 q2 q2 q14 q2 - q0 q4 q2 - - - - 
q3 q3 q3 q15 q3 q4 q3 - q0 - - - - 
q4 q4 q4 q5 q4 - q3 - q2 - - - - 
q5 q6/A q7/B - q4 - q15 - q14 - - - - 
q6 q6 q6 - q4/C - q15/C - q16 q8/E - - - 
q7 q7 q7 - q4/D - q17 - q14/D q9/E - - - 
q8 q8 q8 - q4/C - q15/C - q18 - q5/C q10/F - 
q9 q9 q9 - q4/D - q19 - q14/D - q5/D q11/F - 
q10 q10 q10 - q4/C - q15/C - q20 - - - q12/G 
q11 q11 q11 - q4/D - q21 - q14/D - - - q13/H 
q12 q12 q7/C,B - q4/I - q15/C - q22 - - - - 
q13 q6/D,A q13 - q4/J - q23 - q14/D - - - - 
q14 q16/A q14 - q2 - q1 q4 - - - - - 
q15 q15 q17/B - q3 q4 - - q1 - - - - 

























































q17 q17 q17 - q3/D q7 - - q1/D q19/E - - - 
q18 q18 q18 - q2/C - q1/C q8 - - q14/C q20/F - 
q19 q19 q19 - q3/D q9 - - q1/D - q15/D q21/F - 
q20 q20 q20 - q2/C - q1/C q10 - - - - q22/G 
q21 q21 q21 - q3/D q11 - - q1/D - - - q23/H 
q22 q22 q22 - q2/C - q1/C q12 - - - - - 
q23 q23 q23 - q3/D q13 - - q1/D - - - - 
Table 10. CSM State Transition Table
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Actions 
A User Selection Indicator X begins Flashing. 
B User Selection Indicator Y begins Flashing. 
C User Selection Indicator X is Off. 
D User Selection Indicator Y is Off. 
E Flush Command timer started. 
F The USB Setup Process is allowed to commence. 
G User Selection Indicator X is On. 
H User Selection Indicator Y is On. 
Table 11. CSM State Transition Table Actions 
 
Status Functional Description 
On The User has pressed the User Selection Device for the CPP and the path 
between the selected CPP and the IPPG is logically connected. 
Off The User has not pressed the User Selection Device for the CPP or has 
selected a different CPP.  Therefore, no logical path exists between the CPP 
and the IPPG. 
Flashing The User has pressed the User Selection Device designating the CPP is 
selected, but the switch is still establishing the connection between the 
selected CPP and the IPPG. 
Table 12. User Selection Indicator Functional Descriptions–Final 
B. CONCLUSION 
The design process of a secure keyboard/mouse Switch led to the establishment of 
the following fundamental requirements: 
1. Only a single computer connected to the switch is allowed to 
communicate with the attached keyboard and mouse at any given point in 
time. 
2. A “Flush” command must precede any connection between an attached 
computer and the keyboard and mouse. 
3. No two CPPs are allowed to communicate with each other. 
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An inference can also be made that by properly implementing the requirements 
defined above the implementer will ensure that no data from any CPP will be allowed to 
pass through to any other CPP.  
The idea of a secure keyboard/mouse switch, at first blush, appears to be simple 
and straightforward system.  However, the complex set of states as shown in Figure 23 
and Figure 24 that needed to be developed and understood to achieve the security goals 
show that the system is neither simple nor straightforward.   
In the course of developing these requirements, certain assumptions had to be 
made to insure the security of the system.  These assumptions were: 
1. The attached keyboard will comply with the “Flush” command. 
2. The switch will be able to identify the peripheral USB devices attached to 
the switch as a keyboard and mouse. 
3. The switch will be able to identify all communications between the 
peripheral devices and the computers as legitimate USB traffic intended 
for or from a HID. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The process of designing and building a secure keyboard and mouse switch 
begins with the definition of requirements and mapping those requirements to 
rudimentary state machines.  The independent review provided here establishes some of 
the assurances, but the next step is mapping the assurances to an implementation of the 
design.  The state machines should also go through a more formal analysis to ensure the 
appropriate level of assurance required by the user.  This analysis can be performed by 
tools such as Harel Statecharts7 or Alloy8 for semiformal analysis or for a formal 
analysis, ACL2.9  The hardware used in the implementation of the design should also be 
tested for high robustness. 
                                                 
7 Harel, David.  “Statecharts: A visual formalism for complex systems.” Science of Computer 
Programming 8 (1987): 231-274.  PDF. 
8 Jackson, Daniel.  “Alloy: a lightweight object modeling notation.” ACM Transaction on Software 
Engineering and Methodology 11.2 (2002). PDF. 
9 Kaufmann, Matt, and Moore, J. Strother.  “Industrial Proofs with ACL2.”  PDF File. 
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To be a true KVM switch, the switch should also be able to accurately display any 
of the connected computers on a single video display device.  The uniqueness of the 
video signal may introduce further requirements that will need to be added to the already 
defined requirements in this paper.   
Along with the video signal, there are other technologies currently in use by 
commercially available KVM switches that may be of interest to further the advancement 
of a secure KVM.  These technologies include KVM over IP and Multiuser KVM 
switches.  KVM over IP switches essentially increase the distance that a user can be from 
the physical computer.  These switches involve two separate hardware devices that 
connect via a standard network cable (i.e., CAT5).  The main switch device plugs directly 
into the computers via USB cables and video cables, and when compared to the design 
described in this paper would include the CPPs and the CSM.  The secondary device 
would connect to the keyboard, mouse, and video display device and provide a means for 
the user to select from which computer to send and receive date.  The secondary device 
would also provide a means to display which computer is selected, and may or may not 
include indicators to show which computers are selectable.  In reference to our design, 
the secondary device would include the IPPG, buttons, and any indicator lights.  
Multiuser KVM switches are generally KVM over IP switches that have the added 
functionality to allow more than one console or user access to the attached computers 
through the switch. 
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APPENDIX A:  COMBINED REQUIREMENTS 
C-1. The switch shall enable communication between a keyboard and a 
mouse and at most one computer connected to the switch at a given 
point in time. 
C-2. The switch shall not allow communications with peripheral devices 
connected to the IPPG other than a keyboard on the keyboard port 
and a mouse on the mouse port. 
C-3. The switch shall allow the user to select the computer to be paired 
with the attached keyboard and mouse. 
C-4. The switch shall, indicate which computer, if any, is paired with the 
attached keyboard and mouse. 
C-5. The computers connected to the switch shall be able to boot normally. 
D-1. The switch shall be powered. 
DC-1. Standard wall power will be used to power the device. 
DC-2. Conventional COTS IT and electronics shall be utilized. 
D-2. Core requirements C1, C-3, C-4, and C-5 are applicable only when 
the switch is powered on.  
D-3. The switch shall not allow communication between the keyboard and 
a mouse and any computer when the switch is powered off.  
D-4.  As viewed externally, the switch shall have a finite set of atomic state 
transitions. 
D-5. The switch shall visually present a finite set of internal states of the 
switch. 
DC-3. The switch will support at least two computers. 
DC-4. The switch will present the internal states identifying which computer 
is paired through the switch. 
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DC-5. The main components of the switch will consist of an IPPG, a finite 
number of CPPs, a switch module, and a user interface (see Figure 
12). 
D-6. The switch shall only pair with an active computer connected to a 
CPP. 
DC-6. The switch will indicate which computers are available. 
D-7. At no point in time shall two CPPs be allowed to communicate 
through the core switching module. 
D-8. The switch shall protect the integrity of the communications between 
computer selection devices, the selected computer indicators, the 
CPPs, and the CSM itself. 
DC-7. Protective Design. 
DC-8. The external ports to the switch will be defined by the USB standard. 
DC-9. Each CPP and the IPPG will be coupled with a USB Controller. 
DC-10. The switch will utilize physical buttons for computer selection. 
DC-11. The switch will utilize a GREEN LED light to visually represent the 
currently selected CPP. 
DC-12. The switch will utilize an AMBER LED light to visually represent 
an active CPP. 
DC-13. The GREEN LED will blink while the path between a CPP and the 
IPPG is setup. 
DC-14. The buttons on the front panel will only communicate with the CSM 
DC-15. The green LED lights will be controlled by the same secure 
processor as the buttons. 
DC-16. Each CPP will be coupled with an EM designed to emulate USB 
keyboard functionality to ensure any attached computer can 
properly boot. 
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DC-17. Each EM will be powered via USB from the attached computer while 
the switch is powered off. 
DC-18. The IPPG will be coupled with a secure module to ensure only USB 
packets originating from a HID are transmitted through the switch. 
DC-19. The CPP will be coupled with a secure module to ensure only USB 
packets designated for a HID are transmitted through the switch. 
DC-20. The Computer Available Indicator X will flash to denote an error 
condition detected by the CPP X.  
DC-21. The CSM will consist of a secure module responsible for ensuring the 
correct CPP is allowed to communicate with the IPPG. 
DC-22. The CSM will ignore any user pressing Button X if “Computer X 
Available” is set to 0. 
DC-23. The CSM will provide a secure transition state or set of states 
allowing the IPPG to disconnect from the previously selected CPP 
and connect to the newly selected CPP. 
DC-24. The CSM will send a “Flush” command to the IPPG as part of the 
secure transition state or set of states. 
DC-25. The CSM will wait for the IPPG to affirm completion of the “Flush” 
command before allowing the newly selected CPP to be connected to 
the IPPG or time out reverting back to the “none selected” state. 
DC-26. The IPPG will ensure the buffers of the attached keyboard and 
mouse are properly flushed to insure residual data is removed. 
DC-27. The IPPG will report back to the CSM once the “Flush” command 
has completed successfully. 
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APPENDIX B:  DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS 
Figure 25 depicts the potential data flows while the switch is powered on with a 
keyboard connected to the keyboard port, a mouse connected to the mouse port, and 
computer X is powered on and connected to CPP X.   
 
 
Figure 25. Potential Data Flows with Switch Powered On 
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Figure 26 shows the data flows available through the switch while the switch is 
powered off.  Computer X will provide power over USB to the Emulator Module, which 




Figure 26. Potential Data Flows with Switch Powered Off 
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Figure 27 shows the data flows available through the switch when the IPPG enters 
the error state.  The IPPG will deny any further USB packets from flowing from the 
attached peripheral devices into the CSM, thus preventing the USB packets from 
potentially reaching the currently selected computer.  While in the error state the IPPG 
will turn on the Red LED. 
 
 
Figure 27. Potential Data Flows–IPPG Module Error 
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Figure 28 shows the data flows available through the switch when a CPP enters 
the error state.  The CPP will report that the computer is no longer available to the CSM 
and deny any further USB packets from flowing from the attached computer into the 
CSM, thus preventing the USB packets from potentially reaching the connected 
peripheral devices.  While in the error state the CPP will cause the Amber LED to blink.   
 
 
Figure 28. Potential Data Flow–CPP X Module Error 
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Figure 29 represents the potential data flows available while the switch is 
powered on, there is potentially an attached keyboard and mouse, and one or more 
computers are attached and powered on but none are selected. 
 
 
Figure 29. Potential Data Flows–No CPP Selected 
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Figure 30 represents the potential data flows available while the switch is 
powered on, there is an attached keyboard and mouse, and a computer is attached, 
powered on, and selected.   
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